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We were delighted that Professor Paul Geroski, then Chairman of the UK 
Competition Commission, was able to join us for our expert working group 
meeting in December 2004. Paul’s contribution to our proceedings was 
excellent. He was engaged and informed and made valuable contributions to 
our debate - provoking and stimulating input from the participants. It was the 
first time that many of us had met Paul. With his warm and engaging 
personality we had firm hopes that Paul would become a regular member of 
our group. Sadly that was not to be. As will be known to many readers, Paul 
died in the summer of 2005. We dedicate this collection of papers, to which he 
contributed, to his memory. 
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* The views are not necessarily  even my own final settled views on the 
subject. They are offered to stimulate debate, and they are certainly 
not the official view (or, for that matter, the unofficial view )of the 
 1 
Competition Commission, or any of the members or staff associated 





Most of us share the presumption that when markets work well, they 
ought to be left undisturbed to get on with it. When, however, markets 
do not work well -- when a “market failure” of some type or other 
occurs -- then there is scope for policy intervention. The case for 
intervening is not, of course, a complete no-brainer: intervention in the 
face of market failure only makes sense when it is likely to produce a 
more satisfactory outcome than would be produced were the market 
to be left on it’s own. 
 
Innovation -- or, more broadly, the production of knowledge -- is a 
classic example of an activity that is likely to involve a market failure. 
Knowledge has all the properties of a “public good”: that is, goods 
which are non-rival in use and non-excludable (whether they are 
produced in the private or in the public sector does not matter in this 
context). Non-rival in use means that one individual can consume the 
good in question without any fear of restricting the consumption of the 
same good by another person. Put more simply, with public goods, 
there is no possibility of congestion arising to interfere with the 
consumption of the good or service by particular individuals . Non-
excludability means that it is difficult or impossible to prevent someone 
who has not paid for the good from consuming it. With non-
excludability, free riding by users of knowledge becomes a real 
possibility. Not only does this make it hard for an innovator to sell his/her 
increment of knowledge (and thereby cover his/her costs), but it also 
may make it hard to ascertain just how valuable it really is to 
consumers. 
 
The production of knowledge has a further property that helps to 
cause market failure, namely that while it is costly to produce, it is 
typically costless to reproduce. That is, all the costs of producing 
knowledge are fixed (and they are usually sunk as well). This creates 
two problems: first, knowledge creators must be sure that there is a 
market sufficiently large to cover their fixed costs if they are to make 
the investment in generating new knowledge; and second, the fact 
that reproduction costs are zero means that prices could, and 
probably should, fall to zero. This, in turn, makes it hard to guarantee 
that fixed costs will be covered. 
 
These problems are widely understood and a number of solutions to 
them exist. There is widespread agreement that one way forward is to 
create a set of property rights which exist for a limited period of time 
that will enable an innovator to recoup the costs of the investment s/he 
has made in generating the new knowledge. This property right 
effectively gives the innovator a monopoly in the use of the knowledge 
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s/he has created, enabling him/her to control it’s subsequent use (or, 
at least control the terms on which others can use it). The question that 
I want to address in this brief paper is a simple one: is this the best 
policy that one might use to stimulate innovation?  
 
There is no doubt that intellectual property rights do preserve incentives 
to innovate, but that is not my question. What lies beneath the question 
are two further questions: does the system of intellectual property rights 
that is commonly used have undesirable side effects?  and are there 
other, possibly more effective, ways to stimulate innovation? My answer 
to both of these questions is a qualified yes. In particular, I think that 
one undesirable side effect of intellectual property rights systems is that 
they sometimes inhibit innovation. A second is that they provide 
incentives which are unrelated to the input made by innovators, which 
means that they may well distort incentives to innovate. Finally, I think 
that competition policy has an important role to play in stimulating 
innovative activity, and one that might both complement and even 




intellectual property rights and innovation 
 
 
My first set of observations centres on the question of whether the 
system of intellectual property rights which is commonly used in most 
advanced countries has undesirable side effects. There is no doubt 
that a policy of granting relatively unrestricted monopoly rights to 
particular agents can have undesirable side effects in markets built up 
around the use of the innovation. This is most obviously the case with 
patent licenses that grant exclusive rights or limit the geographical 
application of rights in ways that restrict competition in the market for 
the product produced using the patent. However, there is a second set 
of possible side effects that I want to focus on here, namely those that 
subvert the whole purpose of the policy, namely stimulating innovation. 
 
Innovation is the process by which knowledge advances. The progress 
of learning is marked by the production of new ideas, the wider 
diffusion of existing ideas and the embodiment of ideas in new 
artefacts such as new goods and services. One important feature of 
the production of new knowledge is that knowledge builds on itself: 
new ideas are suggested by old ideas, and they often combine several 
old ideas in a new and quite different package. It follows that the 
process of innovation is likely to be more effective and more efficient if 
today’s innovators are allowed free access to the results of yesterday’s 
innovations. The difficulty is that the intellectual property rights granted 
to protect yesterday’s innovation sometimes allow that innovator to 
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control today’s innovation. When that happens, intellectual property 
rights can impede the rate of innovation. It seems to me that there are 
two particular areas where there might well be a concern that patents 
in particular inhibit innovation.  
 
The first is essentially the problem of the “anti-commons”. Every 
innovator draws from a large and deep well of public knowledge, and 
no one is restricted in the access to, or the use they can make of, 
information in the common domain in which that public knowledge 
resides. Further, since information is essentially a public good – meaning 
that it is non-rival and non-exclusive in use – there is never likely to be a  
problem of congestion in the public domain, and hence there can be 
no real justification for restricting or regulating access to it. It follows that 
anything which restricts access to the public domain, or restricts the size 
of that domain itself, is likely to reduce innovation. More generally, 
licenses which give the licensee rights to the innovation produced by 
the licensor, unduly broad patents and patent claims which cover, or 
lay claim to, knowledge not produced by the patent holder are all 
examples of practices which might pervert the purpose for which 
intellectual property rights were developed. 
 
The second problem arises with complex innovations. When a new 
innovation draws on several different areas of technology, then the 
innovator will need to undertake a series of bilateral negotiations with 
existing intellectual property rights holders if his/her innovation is to see 
the light of day. This, in turn, means that any individual antecedent 
patent holder has the ability to hold up the new innovation, possibly 
using this bargaining power to extract most of the returns that it 
promises to produce for it’s creator.  These “patent thickets”, as they 
are sometimes called, basically inflate the transactions costs of 
developing a new innovation, and are, therefore, likely to inhibit the 
rate of development of new ideas or the good and services that come 
from them. 
 
One of the dilemmas that patent thickets create are that clearing the 
ground for new innovations may – if it was anticipated by the original 
innovators -- well dull the incentive of those who developed the original 
innovations on which all the rest depends. This is, in some ways, much 
the same dilemma that broad patents give: the broader the patent, 
the greater is the incentive to innovate to get that patent; however, 
the broader the patent, the more difficult it is to develop spin-off 
innovations that are tangential to the original innovation. In both cases, 
strong incentives are given to develop new innovations, but these 
incentives can inhibit the further development of those initial new 
innovations. If you like, patent thickets and broad patents encourage 
more innovations today, at the possible expense of more innovations 
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tomorrow. Just how costly a policy this is depends of course on just how 
much of a tomorrow there really is. 
 
 
the design of intellectual property rights 
 
 
My second observation is that even when patents and other forms of 
intellectual property rights do not actually inhibit innovation, they may 
distort incentives in various ways that might reduce the value of the 
innovations which they stimulate. To understand how this might 
happen, it is necessary to step back and think a little about the design 
of intellectual property rights systems. 
 
When a competition economist first encounters the intellectual 
property rights regime that is common  in most countries, their first 
reaction is likely to be bafflement. Competition economists are used to 
the idea that investments -- particularly when they involve a substantial 
amount of sunk costs -- might need to be protected in certain 
circumstances, that firms ought to be able to recover their costs and 
earn a reasonable return on such investments. This is, or ought to be, as 
true in the case of intellectual property as it is  as true of the 
construction of huge power stations, telecommunications networks 
and sewer systems. An inventor or innovator needs to be sure that s/he 
will be properly rewarded for his/her efforts, and, if s/he is not, then 
his/her incentive innovate is bound to be diminished. 
 
This kind of issue typically comes up in the context of public utilities 
where some element of natural monopoly is present. The existence of 
natural monopoly means that the problem for regulators is to insure 
that regulated companies make enough return on their investment, 
but are not allowed to use such investments to extract monopoly 
returns from consumers. Much the same should apply to intellectual 
property rights, and for much the same reasons: they should be strong 
enough to insure that innovators gets a fair return for their efforts, but 
not so strong that they are able to extract unreasonably high returns 
from consumers.  
 
What is really puzzling about the intellectual property rights system is the 
way that it goes about preserving such incentives. For competition 
economists, the natural first step is to sum up all the investments made, 
allow for a bit of risk and compute a rate of return that the innovator 
ought to be allowed to earn on that investment. But, intellectual 
property rights regimes typically grant inventors monopoly rights for a 
fixed period of time regardless of their costs, or, for that matter, of the 
social value of their innovation. Further, these intellectual property 
rights place very few restrictions on the kinds of licensing provisions that 
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inventors can impose on those who wish to take advantage of their 
work, allowing them, in principle, to earn phenomenal returns in some 
circumstances.  
 
Now, one might feel that the traditional design of intellectual property 
rights has the virtues of simplicity, meaning that the much lower costs of 
running the regime more than outweighs it’s limitations. It is certainly 
true that the one size fits all regime reduces the amount of regulation 
which has to occur, and giving inventors 20 years protection regardless 
of what they invent is undoubtedly a lot simpler than computing a 
reasonable rate of return for each innovation that is patented. 
However, simplicity has a price. In particular, one must ask just what 
kind of incentives to innovate does this kind of fixed time limit system 
produce?  
 
There are probably two slightly perverse incentives that are worth 
noting. First, this kind of rights regime steers inventors towards those 
types of innovations or inventions that property rights can actually 
protect -- it is clearly more profitable to invent things that are 
patentable than things which are not. Further, because the upside can 
be unlimited, it arguably steers too many resources into such 
innovations. If innovators are able to extract whatever they can from 
users, successful innovations can generate revenues that vastly exceed 
their costs. Second and harking back to a point made earlier, there is 
little need or incentive for innovators to channel those gains into 
producing further innovation. The rights given to intellectual property 
rights holders  protect the investments that they have already made, 
and there is no requirement that these returns are invested into further 
innovative activity (although it is not wholly obvious that there should 
be). Hence, the time limited regime incentivizes first time innovation, 
possibly at the cost of follow on innovation. 
 
 
competition policy and innovation 
 
 
My third and final set of observations centres around the question of 
whether there are other, possibly more effective ways to stimulate 
innovation. In fact, it is well known that there are a number of 
alternative routes to this end, and the relative merits of most of them 
have been widely debated. It has long been understood that 
procurement practices (such as those which underlie user led 
innovation processes) can be a major driver of innovation. Similarly, the 
use of R&D subsidies and more general public spending on research 
will clearly stimulate innovation, as may business support policies 
directed at entrepreneurial high tech firms. In what follows I want to 
 7 
focus on yet a further alternative, namely the use of competition policy 
to stimulate innovation. 
 
It has long been believed that competition and innovation are not 
compatible, that truly competitive markets (at least in the textbook 
sense of “perfect competition”) are incapable of sustaining innovative 
activities by firms. Usually associated with the work of Joseph 
Schumpeter, the argument is, in essence, that  in the absence of some 
monopoly power, firms will be unwilling to invest in innovation. The 
presence of some monopoly will insure that prices are above variable 
costs, and, hence, that fixed costs can be paid off. Further, the 
existence of some excess profits gives firms the option of funding 
innovation out of retained profits, something that might be easier to do 
than borrowing from uninformed, risk averse investors. Such firms may 
also have the capabilities to innovate, having been able to finance 
the development of skills and capabilities that they would otherwise 
lack. Finally, some degree of monopoly power may make it somewhat 
easier to market the new idea or the good or service which embodies 
it; that is, a monopolist is likely to be able to appropriate more of the 
returns to his/her innovation than would a firm in a very competitive 
market. 
 
The big problem with these arguments is that they do not address 
incentives. There is very little doubt that monopolists have the ability to 
innovate -- they are likely to have the cash flow, market position, skills 
and even scale of activities to undertake R&D, and bring new products 
to market. Whether they actually will do so is another question entirely. 
Most firms who have a well established market position have 
accomplished this on the back of particular innovations and the 
development of particular expertise. They have made deep 
investments in serving their market in a particular way -- investing in 
procurement systems, customer relationships, in large scale 
manufacturing -- and they have shaped their organization to match 
what they are doing. Innovative activity is, however, disruptive, and 
anything that disrupts a profitable activity not always welcome. 
 
It is worth trying to make this point more precisely by distinguishing two 
types of innovation: what are called “sustaining innovations” and 
“disruptive innovations”. Sustaining innovations offer consumers more of 
the same basic proposition, and they draw on - and deepen -- the 
existing skills sets of firms. New personal computers that offer more 
computing speed or more memory are examples, as are cars that 
drive faster, or more economically, than existing cars. Disruptive 
innovations, on the other hand, offer consumers quite a different 
proposition, and they often demand the development of new skills and 
expertise by firms. They are sometimes called “competence destroying 
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innovations” (sustaining innovations are sometimes called 
“competence enhancing”).  
 
The point is really simple. A well established firm with some degree of 
market power is much more likely to prefer to introduce sustaining 
innovations than disruptive innovations. Sustaining innovations build on, 
and develop, what it is already good at; they will help to protect it’s 
existing business against the challenge of slower, less adept rivals. 
Disruptive innovations, on the other hand, offer lower net returns for 
established firms than they offer for new players. For an established firm, 
the gain to introducing a disruptive innovation is the gross profits from 
doing so, less the loss of profits from activities that the innovation 
displaces. For new firms or outsiders, there is no existing activity to 
displace and so net loss. It has, therefore, a larger incentive to 
introduce a disruptive innovation. 
 
There is a further point worth considering. The Schumpeterian 
arguments that I have just been discussing all suggest that it is 
monopoly ex ante which matters for innovation: it is firms who already 
have some market power that the Schumpeterian argument identifies 
as likely innovators. It follows that there is a real conflict with 
competition policy: if this Schumpeterian argument is correct, then any 
attempt to attack positions of market power is likely to retard 
innovation. Intellectual property rights, on the other hand, are 
concerned to create monopoly ex poste -- that is, after the innovation 
has been made -- order to stimulate innovation. It is the promise of 
monopoly -- not it’s actual fact -- that stimulates innovation in this line 
of thinking.  Any attack on existing monopoly positions will, in this view, 
not affect innovation since what matters is the expectation of having a 
monopoly (at least temporally) on the use of the innovation after it is 
made. This is perfectly compatible with having a good deal of 






I started this paper with a question --  is the system of intellectual 
property rights that we are all familiar with the best way to stimulate 
innovation? – and the gist of what I have had to say is that the answer 
is “maybe”. In a sense, this is not a surprising conclusion: it is just too 
hard to be sure just what the best policy is in almost every setting that 
this question comes up in. At a more sensible level, however, “maybe” 
is an answer that is pregnant with possibilities. Most of these arise from 
two different types of observations: first, that intellectual property rights 
systems can inhibit innovation, or at least distort it in particular 
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directions; and second, that competition and innovation are not 
inimical.  
 
For me, as a competition policy practitioner, the argument that 
competition stimulates innovation is an important one, for it suggests 
that competition policy is not necessarily in conflict with the use of 
intellectual property rights to stimulate innovation. At a practical level, 
this argument seems to me to have two implications. First, it seems 
clear that one ought to regard restrictive licensing practices as just 
what they are: namely, restrictive practices. In this, as in many other 
areas of anti-trust, the rule of reason ought to apply. That is, such 
practices should be evaluated in the context of the benefits which 
they might – or might not – bring to consumers, in both the short and 
also the long run. Second, anything that substantially lessens, or 
adversely affects, competition in a particular market is, or should at 
least potentially be regarded as, a threat to innovation. And, the need 
to stimulate innovation is the one thing that both competition policy 
and intellectual property rights have in common. 
 
 
 
